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Abstract 
Although the suppression of thoughts may seem to be an effective solution, this strategy can lead 
to an exacerbation of the very thought that one is attempting to suppress. This ironic effect is the 
most obvious unwanted outcome of suppression and has now been investigated empirically for 
more than two decades. However, the fact that suppression is an effortful process implies that, 
even when suppression does not lead to an ironic rebound of the unwanted thought, it puts an 
insidious cognitive load on the individual attempting to suppress.  Moreover, whether or not 
suppression leads to an exacerbation of the unwanted thought, it is rarely successful, and hence 
adds to the individual’s distress. In this article we describe the phenomenon of suppression and 
consider how it might complicate a range of emotional disorders.  Taken together, studies on 
thought suppression in psychopathology present a more nuanced picture now than was emerging 
in the early years of its investigation.  Some evidence is consistent with the idea that the 
counterproductive effects of suppression are causally implicated in the disorder, but for the most 
part a more parsimonious conclusion is that thought suppression acts as a complication of the 
disorder.  In certain disorders, suppression complicates the disorder by leading to an ironic 
rebound of the unwanted thoughts.  In all disorders, the cost of undertaking suppression is a 
persistent cognitive load, which, in turn undermines the ability to suppress, and hence sets off a 
cycle of failed expectations and distress.                                                                                                                 Hidden Complications   1  
                                                                                               
Much to his annoyance, a thought popped into his mind.  It was very clear and very 
distinct, and he had now come to recognize these thoughts for what they were.  His 
instinct was to resist them.  They were the preordained promptings from the dark and 
locked off parts of his mind.  He sat still and ignored the thought furiously.  It nagged at 
him.  He ignored it.  It nagged at him.  He ignored it.  It nagged at him.  He gave in to it. 
 
Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe (1980, p. 172) 
 
Sometimes science fiction can remind us of science fact.  In the case of this fantasy novel 
by Douglas Adams, the fact of which we are reminded is the insistent and inevitable return of an 
unwanted thought.  Thoughts we put out of mind seem to come back with a vengeance that 
makes us wonder whether we may have gone mad.  Now as it happens, the hypothesis that 
recurrent unwanted intrusive thoughts might be associated with psychopathology has occurred to 
many psychologists over the years (Clark, 2005; Rachman & De Silva, 1978).  This paper 
reviews research on how the suppression of such unwanted thoughts is related to psychological 
disorder. 
The experience of mental disorder is often associated with painful thoughts and feelings 
and thus will commonly motivate suppression as a reaction (Najmi & Wegner, in press; Wegner, 
1989).  Most early research on intrusive and obsessive thoughts operated under the assumption 
that suppression is always reactive in this way, and so did not develop the complementary 
possibility—that suppression might itself prompt the intrusive return of the suppressed thought.  
Attention was drawn to this paradoxical effect of suppression by the “white bear” studies in our 
lab—in which people couldn’t stop thinking of a white bear in five minutes of trying (Wegner,                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987).  This effect has now been investigated empirically for more 
than two decades.  In the present paper, we examine this literature to gauge the roles that thought 
suppression may play—as a response to intrusive thoughts, as a cause of them, and more 
generally, as a complicating factor in the etiology of psychopathology.  We believe that 
suppression complicates disorders by expanding their psychological damage in subtle ways and 
hence making them more resistant to treatment. 
It is important to place our theory of suppression’s role in psychopathology in the larger 
context of research related to the etiology of perseverative thinking. There are a number of 
prominent theories of perseverative thinking, many with considerable supporting evidence (for a 
recent review, see Watkins, 2008). These include, for example, control theory (Carver & Scheier, 
1982) and the ruminative response style theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), which are largely 
independent of thought suppression.  
It is also important to clarify at the outset what we mean by suppression in this article. 
According to the ironic process theory of mental control (Wegner, 1994), successful suppression 
is achieved by increasing the accessibility of distracter thoughts.  Usually when people try to 
suppress thoughts, they tend to undertake an unfocused distraction strategy—the iterative use of 
many different distracters rather than just one focus—and experience a rebound of the 
suppressed thought (Wegner, Schneider, Knutson, & McMahon, 1991).  However, this rebound 
effect is attenuated when using one focused distracter thought. Wegner et al. (Experiment 2, 
1987) have found that focused distraction can be effective in getting rid of unwanted thoughts. 
For example, in their study, participants were able to suppress thoughts of a white bear if they 
focused instead on thoughts of a red Volkswagen. Focused distraction can at times be quite 
effective, and it is specifically unfocused distraction to which we refer throughout this article.                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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In this article, we begin by describing the phenomenon of suppression.  Next, we discuss 
the specific ways in which suppression is a disorder-complicating moderator of 
psychopathology, focusing in turn on anxiety disorders and then depressive disorders, substance 
abuse, and self-injurious behaviors.  We explore how suppression may complicate mental 
disorders by ironically increasing the recurrence of suppressed thoughts, introducing a persistent 
cognitive load, and otherwise adding to distress. 
The Phenomenon of Suppression 
Not everybody believes in the effectiveness of suppression, of course, but many do, for 
example, those scoring high on the Thought Control Beliefs factor of a questionnaire designed to 
assess beliefs about the process and outcome of thinking (Metacognitive Beliefs Questionnaire; 
MCBQ; Clark, Purdon, & Wang, 2003). Typical items on the questionnaire include “I should be 
able to gain complete control over my mind if I exercise enough will power.” But as the white 
bear studies revealed, this is generally not the case.  Instead, suppression can lead to an 
exacerbation of the very thoughts one is attempting to suppress.  Wegner (1994) offered a theory 
of “ironic processes” to account for this effect.  The theory holds that two processes are involved 
in suppression: an effortful and conscious operating process that diverts attention away from 
unwanted thoughts, and an effortless and unconscious ironic monitoring process that both 
maintains vigilance for occurrences in awareness of the unwanted thought, and triggers further 
action of the operating process if the unwanted thought appears in awareness. These two 
processes work hand in hand to ensure that unwanted thoughts remain outside of awareness.  
Ironically, however, by maintaining vigilance for the unwanted thought, the monitoring system 
helps assure that the unwanted thought never becomes dormant.  Two aspects of this dual-
process mechanism of suppression are particularly relevant to psychopathology: First, since the                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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operating process is effortful, suppression is psychologically costly (cf. Barrett, Tugade, & 
Engle, 2004), and second, if suppression is attempted under conditions of competing cognitive 
load, the effortful operating process is impaired and hence the effortless monitoring process 
begins to usher in the very thoughts that are targeted by the suppression attempt, thereby 
resulting in an ironic return of the unwanted thought. 
There is now considerable evidence for the ironic return of unwanted thoughts.  In the 
original thought suppression experiments, Wegner et al. (1987) found that after a period of 
thought suppression, people instructed to stop suppressing the thought and instead to begin 
thinking about it reported more intrusions of the thought than occurred without prior suppression.  
This “rebound effect” has since been observed repeatedly (see reviews by Abramowitz, Tolin, & 
Street, 2001; Rassin, 2005; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000).  Subsequent studies revealed, in accord 
with the ironic process theory, that this effect is particularly likely to occur under conditions of 
mental load. In both clinical and non-clinical populations, the unwanted thought is faster to 
return to consciousness while it is being actively suppressed. 
In addition to empirical support for the ironic, intrusive, return of unwanted thoughts, 
there also exists evidence indicating difficulty disengaging from these thoughts. For instance, 
Wegner and Erber (1992) found that people suppressing a thought under cognitive load showed 
interference with the task of color-naming in a modified Stroop (1935) paradigm.  Remarkably, 
this interference was even greater than the interference found when people were concentrating on 
the thought under load.  These results imply that people could not disengage attention to escape 
from the unwanted thought, and this difficulty became more pronounced with the imposition of 
cognitive load.  This hyperaccessibility of suppressed thoughts has also been observed repeatedly                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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with clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 
1997; Klein, 2007; Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997; Page, Locke, & Trio, 2005). 
The combination of an ironic, intrusive, return of unwanted thoughts and difficulty of 
escape from them represents a certain asymmetry in the way unwanted thoughts are linked to 
other thoughts in our associative networks: We find ourselves being reminded of a particular 
unwanted thought by most everything that comes to mind, but the idea itself seems to remind us 
of nothing more than our desire to eliminate it from consciousness.  This unusual asymmetry in 
the way unwanted thoughts are linked to other thoughts was examined in a recent study (Najmi 
& Wegner, 2008).  Participants who were asked to suppress a thought or to concentrate on it 
completed a task assessing the influence of priming on reaction time to word/nonword judgments 
(associative priming lexical decision task).  Results indicated that suppression under cognitive 
load produced asymmetric priming: Priming with the associate of a suppressed word speeded 
reaction time to the suppressed word, but priming with a suppressed word did not speed reaction 
time to associated words.  This suggests that suppression induces an unusual form of cognitive 
accessibility in which movement of activation toward the suppressed thought from associates is 
facilitated but movement of activation away from the suppressed thought to associates is 
undermined.  Thus, suppression of an unwanted thought ironically increases its return while 
precluding other related thoughts from entering into awareness.  This notion that suppressed 
thoughts are a cognitive dead-end of sorts might well explain the phenomenon of perseverative 
thinking that characterizes a wide array of psychological disorders. 
Suppression in Psychological Disorders  
A question that remains unanswered is how the perseverative thinking that characterizes 
many psychological disorders begins in the first place.  One possibility proposed in the theory of                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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synthetic obsessions (Wegner, 1989) is that suppression itself is the cause of subsequent 
intrusions and obsessive thinking.  This idea that suppression failure is an etiological process in 
certain forms of psychological disorder has dictated much of the early empirical investigation of 
thought suppression in psychopathology.  Research has yielded some evidence that the 
counterproductive effects of suppression may be causally implicated in psychopathology, but for 
the most part a more parsimonious conclusion is that suppression acts as a complication of 
psychopathology.  In certain disorders, suppression complicates the disorder by leading to an 
ironic rebound of the unwanted thoughts.  In all disorders, the cost of an effortful strategy such 
as suppression is a cognitive load, which, in turn undermines the ability to suppress (Beevers & 
Scott, 2001; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996).  Finally, unrealistic expectations 
of suppression success and inevitable failure to achieve these unrealistic expectations set off a 
relentless cycle of distress, mental load, and unyielding, unwanted thoughts. 
Anxiety Disorders  
Obsessive-compulsive Disorder (OCD) is defined by the persistence of intrusive 
thoughts.  Although the occurrence of unwanted, intrusive, thoughts is a normative phenomenon, 
compared to non-clinical individuals, OCD patients experience more frequent, distressing 
intrusive thoughts, perceive them to be less controllable, and more strongly try to resist them 
using maladaptive mental control strategies such as thought suppression (Janeck & Calamari, 
1999; Rachman & De Silva, 1978).  In one study, Purdon, Rowa, and Antony (2007) asked OCD 
patients to keep a detailed diary of their suppression attempts over a three-day period and found 
that individuals with OCD indeed engage in frequent, effortful, unsuccessful suppression of 
unwanted thoughts.  According to the cognitive-behavioral perspective on OCD (Rachman, 
1997; Salkovskis, 1985), the intrusive thoughts that characterize many psychological disorders                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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may persist because of faulty pre-existing beliefs, faulty interpretations of intrusions, and futile 
efforts to suppress the intrusive thoughts.   
The counterproductive effects of suppressing negative, intrusive thoughts in non-clinical 
samples have been observed fairly consistently (for exceptions, see Kelly & Kahn, 1994; Purdon 
& Clark, 2001).  In a series of studies using non-clinical analogue samples, Salkovskis and 
colleagues (Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994; Trinder & Salkovskis, 
1994) observed a suppression-related increase in intrusive thoughts both in the lab and over a 
four-day naturalistic follow-up.  McNally and Ricciardi (1996) presented non-clinical 
participants with a list of thoughts reflecting various themes of obsessions and asked them to 
identify one that they had previously experienced.  They observed a marginally significant 
tendency for the obsessional thought to occur more often after suppression whereas neutral 
thoughts tended to occur less frequently after suppression.  In a more recent study with a non-
clinical sample, although Marcks and Woods (2005) did not find evidence for a suppression-
related rebound of unwanted thoughts, they found that those instructed to suppress were unable 
to do so, and that they reported an increase in level of distress after suppression.  Similar to the 
lab study, naturalistic follow-up (e.g., Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) revealed that suppression of 
personally-relevant intrusive thoughts was associated with an increase in subjective ratings of 
discomfort.  
To date, there has been limited investigation of the effects of instructed suppression of 
obsessional thoughts in OCD.  Purdon, Rowa, and Antony (2005) found that individuals with 
OCD exerted effort to suppress their obsessional thought despite explicit instructions not to 
suppress.  This highlights the sheer relentlessness of the suppression-related cognitive load 
experienced by OCD patients. It may also explain the absence of suppression rebound or                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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enhancement effects in the studies of instructed suppression of obsessional thoughts conducted 
with clinical samples of OCD patients (Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Purdon et al., 2005).  Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Przeworski, and Foa (2002) argue that if individuals with OCD have general 
deficits in their ability to control thoughts, this will be manifested in their ability to control 
neutral thoughts.  Consistent with their hypothesis, they found that individuals with OCD had 
more occurrences of a neutral target thought after suppressing compared to baseline. 
It is possible, however, that the studies of instructed suppression of obsessional thoughts 
in OCD patients (Janeck & Calamari, 1999; Purdon et al., 2005) reflect accurately the lack of 
suppression-related rebound/enhancement effects.  This absence of a suppression-related 
increase in obsessions notwithstanding, the psychological damage associated with chronic 
suppression in OCD is profound.  One possibility is that suppression works temporarily.  If so, it 
serves as a neutralization strategy (Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2007), terminates exposure to the 
obsession and prevents disconfirmation of the perceived negative consequences of the obsession.  
Thus, it serves to maintain anxiety associated with the obsession in the long run.  
Another possibility is that suppression fails.  Failed suppression can serve to increase the 
salience of the unwanted thought and the need to control it in order to avoid the perceived 
negative consequences.  Failure of suppression is associated with worse mood, and faulty 
appraisals of suppression failure may lead to greater effort to suppress (Clark, 2004; Purdon et 
al., 2005).  Faulty appraisals of the failure of suppression and faulty beliefs about the need to 
control thoughts and about the controllability of thoughts may be both causal precursors of the 
obsessional state as well as complicating factors that further aggravate it. Clark, Purdon, and 
Wang (2003) investigated the relationship between obsessional thinking and faulty beliefs about 
the control of intrusive thoughts in a large sample of college students. They found that such                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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beliefs about the control of intrusive thoughts and perceived negative consequences of a failure 
to suppress such thoughts had a unique significant relationship with obsessions. The authors 
conclude that metacognitive beliefs—beliefs about the process and outcome of ones own 
thinking—are implicated in the pathogenesis of obsessions. Consistent with this, Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Hamlin, Foa, and Synodi (2002) observed that OCD patients were more likely than 
anxious and non-anxious controls to attribute a failure of thought suppression to internal, 
negative attributions (e.g., “I am mentally weak”).  These beliefs may predispose the individual 
to exert more attempts at control over thoughts, and consequently, to suffer the 
counterproductive effects of mental control.  Thus, it may well be the case that repeated attempts 
at suppression serve to exacerbate distress and to maintain an obsessional state.   
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is characterized by unwanted intrusions of 
traumatic recollections and avoidance of all things associated with the trauma.  This suggests that 
individuals with PTSD are motivated to suppress trauma-related thoughts.  However, recent 
studies with non-clinical samples reveal that suppression enhances memory bias for threat-
related material (Kircanski, Craske, & Bjork, 2008), thus setting the stage for a 
counterproductive cycle of suppression of trauma-related thoughts.   
Research on thought suppression in PTSD indicates that the disorder is characterized by a 
bias in the ability to suppress trauma-related thoughts.  Shipherd and Beck (1999) examined the 
effects of instructed suppression of rape-related thoughts in female sexual assault survivors with 
PTSD and those without PTSD following the sexual assault.  They found that trauma survivors 
with PTSD experienced a post-suppression rebound in the frequency of rape-related thoughts, 
whereas trauma survivors without PTSD did not experience a rebound.  A more recent study 
(Shipherd & Beck, 2005) replicated these findings in a follow-up investigation of the intentional                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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suppression of trauma-related thoughts in survivors of motor vehicle accidents with and without 
PTSD.  Results revealed that both groups successfully suppressed trauma-related thoughts 
temporarily, but that the PTSD group experienced a post-suppression rebound, whereas the no-
PTSD group did not.  In this study, participants were given an additional task of suppressing a 
personally relevant thought that was not related to the trauma.  In this task, the PTSD group did 
not experience a rebound effect, suggesting that this effect was specific to the suppression of 
their trauma-related thoughts.  However, in a further follow up study (Beck, 2006), both PTSD 
and no-PTSD groups showed a post-suppression rebound of trauma-related thoughts, suggesting 
that difficulties in suppressing trauma-related thoughts may be ubiquitous after exposure to 
trauma, and not specific to PTSD. 
Finally, correlational studies have shown an association between the tendency for chronic 
suppression and the severity of PTSD symptoms (e.g., Vazquez et al., in press).  Taken together, 
results to date suggest that the mental effort expended in the suppression of trauma-related 
thoughts serves only to exacerbate trauma-related intrusions and consequent distress. 
  Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is characterized by the persistence of 
uncontrollable worries.  Worry is defined as thoughts that are motivated by the avoidance of 
emotionally negative imagery and of concomitant aversive somatic sensations (Borkovec & Inz, 
1990).  According to this conceptualization, although worry is initiated in order to avoid imagery 
of future catastrophe and of current anxiety sensations, it quickly becomes aversive and is 
experienced as increasingly uncontrollable (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995).  An important 
difference between worries and the type of unwanted thoughts in OCD and PTSD discussed 
above is that they are ego-syntonic (consistent with the individual’s self-image) and hence the 
motivation to suppress them is not obvious.  It may be the case, however, that once the worries                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
 
 
11 
 
themselves become aversive, they may motivate a cycle of counterproductive attempts to 
suppress them.  Consistent with this, Wells’ (1995) metacognitive theory suggests that 
individuals with GAD engage in unsuccessful suppression of intrusive thoughts that trigger 
worry, and that they tend to interpret suppression failures as evidence for loss of mental control. 
Nevertheless, a study conducted by Behar, Vescio, and Borkovec (2005) to distinguish 
between the effects of thought- versus image-suppression about a worrisome target did not reveal 
a rebound effect for either group.  Becker, Rinck, Roth, and Margraf (1998) tested the hypothesis 
that patients with GAD show a bias in ability to suppress their worries.  Consistent with their 
hypothesis, they observed that GAD patients found it more difficult to suppress thoughts of their 
worries than thoughts of a neutral target.  However, Mathews and Milroy (1994) did not observe 
a suppression-specific rebound effect for worries in a non-clinical sample of excessive worriers.  
They found that worriers had more frequent worry thoughts than non-worriers regardless of 
whether or not they were instructed to suppress.  Finally, McLean and Broomfield’s (2007) study 
revealed results that were in direct contradiction to Wells’ (1995) metacognitive theory of GAD: 
Those instructed to suppress worries were successful in spending less time thinking about them, 
and found them more controllable and less distressing.  Taken together, it appears that 
individuals with GAD may well be motivated to suppress aversive thoughts and/or images; 
however, the consequences of suppression for this group remain unclear. 
In addition to GAD, clinical insomnia is also characterized by persistent worries 
(Borkovec, 1982).  Harvey (2003) found that compared to control participants, people with 
insomnia reported a greater use of suppression to control their pre-sleep worries.  Furthermore, 
those with insomnia instructed to suppress worries reported worse sleep quality and longer sleep-
onset latency than did those with insomnia in the no-suppression condition.  An interesting                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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aspect of these findings is that, although suppression exacerbated sleep disturbance, it did not 
lead to a rebound of worries.  Thus, it may be the case that the effort expended to suppress pre-
sleep worries is largely responsible for the worsening of the disorder. 
Depression and Dysphoria 
Research on the role of thought suppression in depression has yielded two main 
conclusions: One is the fairly robust finding that the suppression of depressive thoughts results in 
a rebound of these thoughts (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988a); the other, more subtle, 
consequence of suppression of depressive thoughts is that it may mask a cognitive vulnerability 
to depression (Wenzlaff, 1998).   
According to the cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1967), a depressive schema 
underlying the disorder makes depressotypic information more accessible.  It follows that when 
depressed individuals attempt to suppress, they do so by choosing distracters that are mood 
congruent, hence closely linked to their suppression target (Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1988b), 
thereby resulting in a quick return of attention to the unwanted thought.  This finding has been 
replicated reliably in studies of suppression with dysphoric individuals (Conway, Howell, & 
Giannopoulos, 1991; Howell & Conway, 1992; Renaud & McConnell, 2002; Wenzlaff, 2005; 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Klein, 1991).  A recent study extended these findings to the domain of 
autobiographical memory (Dalgleish & Yiend, 2006).  Results showed that in dysphoric 
individuals, the suppression of a negative memory resulted in increased activation of other 
negative information (presumably distracters used in order to achieve suppression), thereby 
rendering negative information more accessible on a subsequent autobiographical-memory 
retrieval task.                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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An important aspect of depression is that it is associated with impairment in cognitive 
resources.  More specifically, depressed mood may deplete the cognitive resources needed for an 
effortful cognitive process such as suppression.  Hartlage, Alloy, Vázquez, and Dykman (1993) 
have observed that depression interferes mostly with effortful processing and only minimally 
with automatic processing.  Thus, ironic process theory (Wegner, 1994) predicts that suppression 
undertaken during a depressed mood would impair functioning of the effortful operating process 
(which diverts attention away from the target thought) and leave unhindered the functioning of 
the automatic monitoring process (which maintains vigilance for the target thought), thereby 
increasing accessibility of the target thought. 
The hypothesis that suppression conceals a cognitive vulnerability to depression was 
proposed by Wenzlaff and Bates (1998) and tested in a series of studies with individuals at high 
risk for depression (e.g., individuals remitted from depression).  Theories of cognitive 
vulnerability to depression assert that depressive schemata may be latent but can be activated by 
conditions similar to those experiences that were initially responsible for creation of the 
schemata (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  According to Wenzlaff and Bates (1998), 
individuals remitted from depression may in fact be suppressing the depressive cognitions 
associated with the underlying depressive schema.  In this sense, the depressive cognitions of 
remitted-depressed individuals are latent not in that they are inactive but because their influence 
is masked by active suppression.   
Research in this area supports the idea that thought suppression masks a cognitive 
vulnerability to depression and that this vulnerability becomes apparent when mental control is 
disabled by the imposition of an additional cognitive load (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Wenzlaff, 
1998; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001; Wenzlaff, Meir, & Salas, 2002; Wenzlaff, Rude, Taylor,                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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Stultz, & Sweatt, 2001).  One such study, for example, revealed that the imposition of a 
cognitive load caused remitted-depressed individuals to interpret recorded homophones in a 
more negative fashion (performing more similar to depressed than to control subjects), and that 
this was not the case without the cognitive load.  Similar studies have been done using scrambled 
sentences which could be unscrambled to form depression-relevant themes.  In all of these 
studies, the increase in negative thinking induced by the cognitive load was significantly 
correlated with Wegner and Zanakos’s (1994) measure of propensity to suppress unwanted 
thoughts.  Results of these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that the active suppression 
of depressive thoughts may serve to mask an underlying depressive schema in individuals at risk 
for depression. 
Substance Abuse 
Research on thought suppression in substance use supports the idea that suppression leads 
to an increase in substance-related information.  Early research in this area revealed that 
individuals in the process of quitting smoking experienced an enhancement of smoking-related 
intrusions under suppression (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994).  Palfai, Colby, Monti, and 
Rohsenow (1997) tested the hypothesis that in a sample of heavy social drinkers, suppression of 
urges to drink would lead to increased accessibility of alcohol-related information, particularly 
information regarding expectancies about the effects of alcohol.  In their study, heavy social 
drinkers were exposed to their usual alcoholic drink during which one group was instructed to 
suppress the urge to drink alcohol and the other group received no instructions.  Following this, 
both groups made timed judgments about the applicability of a number of alcohol outcome 
expectancies.  As hypothesized, those in the suppression condition were faster to endorse alcohol 
outcome expectancies than those in the control condition.  This heightened accessibility of                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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alcohol-related information under suppression in heavy social drinkers is consistent with results 
of a study conducted with a sample of alcohol abusers.  In this study, Klein (2007) found that 
alcoholic subjects who had tried to suppress thoughts of alcohol prior to performing a modified 
Stroop task showed increased interference for the word “alcohol” as compared to those alcoholic 
subjects who had expressed thoughts about alcohol freely prior to the task.  These results are 
consistent with the idea that suppression of substance-related thoughts leads to hyperaccessibility 
(Wegner & Erber, 1992) of substance-related information and that this may play a role in 
maintaining the disorder.   
Some research suggests that, in addition to the observable increase in accessibility of 
substance-related material, suppression may affect health in more subtle ways.  For instance, the 
effects of suppression in alcohol abuse have been assessed on biological indicators of 
psychological well-being, such as heart-rate variability (HRV).  HRV has been shown to be 
positively correlated with measures of cognitive flexibility and with the ability to regulate 
emotion (Johnsen et al., 2003).  Consistent with this idea, Ingjaldsson, Laberg, and Thayer 
(2003) found a negative association between HRV and the propensity to suppress unwanted 
thoughts in chronic alcohol abuse.  These results support earlier findings that suggest that low 
HRV is associated with impaired cognitive control and rigid thinking (Thayer & Lane, 2002), 
and that thought suppression is particularly counterproductive for reducing alcohol-related urges 
and cravings (Palfai, Colby et al., 1997; Palfai, Monti, Colby, & Rohsenow, 1997). 
Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behaviors 
The role of suppression in maintaining self-injurious thoughts and behaviors has not been 
studied extensively.  These thoughts and behaviors include suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, 
and non-suicidal self-injury, or direct, deliberate destruction of body tissue in which there is no                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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intent to die (e.g., cutting or burning one’s skin).  Recent conceptualizations of self-injurious 
behaviors suggest that they functions to avoid aversive cognitive and/or emotional experiences 
(Baumeister, 1990; Boergers, Spirito, & Donaldson, 1998; Chapman, Gratz, & Brown, 2005; 
Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005).  It follows that individuals engaging in self-injurious thoughts 
and behaviors may be motivated to intentionally suppress aversive thoughts and experiences. 
To date, no experimental studies of suppression in this group have been reported. A 
recent correlational study by Najmi, Wegner, and Nock (2007) tested a model suggesting that the 
propensity to suppress unwanted thoughts is a cognitive mediator of the relationship between 
emotional reactivity and self-injurious thoughts and behaviors.  Results of this cross-sectional 
study revealed that the tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts partially mediates the 
relationship between emotional reactivity and the frequency of non-suicidal self-injury as well as 
suicidal ideation.  Moreover, those with a higher tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts 
reported engaging in non-suicidal self-injury primarily in order to reduce aversive emotions.  
Thus, it is likely that a general tendency to suppress unwanted thoughts is manifested in the need 
to suppress the specific distressing thoughts and emotions that trigger non-suicidal self-injury.   
Conclusion 
The past two decades have yielded substantial evidence for the harmful role of thought 
suppression in psychopathology.  During this time, theories of suppression in psychological 
disorder have become increasingly nuanced and complex.  Table 1 presents a summary of the 
various antecedents, consequences, and targets of thought suppression that have been explored in  
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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this research. Much of the earlier research on thought suppression and mental disorder focused 
primarily on the ironic return of the unwanted thoughts. More recently, our understanding of the 
role of suppression in psychopathology has been broadened by investigations of the less obvious 
consequences of suppression as well as the cognitive precursors of suppression. Some evidence 
is consistent with the idea that the counterproductive effects of suppression may be causally 
implicated in psychological disorder, but in many cases a more parsimonious conclusion is that 
thought suppression acts as a complication of the disorder (Najmi & Wegner, in press).  In 
certain disorders, suppression complicates the disorder by leading to an ironic rebound of the 
unwanted thoughts.  Across many disorders, the hidden cost of undertaking suppression can be a 
persistent cognitive load, which in turn undermines the ability to suppress and hence sets off a 
cycle of failed expectations and distress.  Apparently, it’s not necessary to go to the restaurant at 
the end of the universe to find unwanted complications of thought suppression.  They’re on the 
menu at the diner right next door.                                                                                                               Hidden Complications    
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Table 1. 
Possible antecedents and consequences of thought suppression 
Antecedents of Thought 
Suppression 
Consequences of Thought Suppression 
   Suppression Target  Consequence 
Faulty negative appraisals 
of UITs 
Obsessional, trauma-related, 
or depressive, thoughts 
Increases frequency of UITs 
Faulty beliefs about the 
need to control UITs 
Obsessional, trauma-related, 
depressive, or worry-related 
thoughts 
Increases distress 
Faulty beliefs about the 
controllability of UITs 
Obsessional, trauma-related, 
depressive, or worry-related 
thoughts 
Depletes cognitive resources 
/ Interferes with other 
cognitively effortful tasks 
Faulty negative beliefs 
about the failure of 
thought suppression 
Obsessional or trauma-
related, thoughts 
Prevents habituation of UIT-
related anxiety 
  Obsessional, trauma-related, 
or depressive, thoughts 
Increases salience of UIT 
  Negative thoughts or 
memories 
Mediates effect of emotional 
reactivity on self-injurious 
thoughts and behaviors 
  Trauma-related thoughts  Enhances memory bias for 
unwanted material 
  Worry-related thoughts  Reduces quality of sleep 
  Worry-related thoughts  Increases sleep onset latency 
  Obsessional, trauma-related, 
depressive, or worry-related 
thoughts 
Increases effort to suppress 
  Depressive memories  Increases accessibility of 
other depressive memories 
  Substance-related thoughts  Increases accessibility of 
alcohol-related information 
   Substance-related thoughts  Increases alcohol-related 
urges/cravings 
UIT = Unwanted Intrusive Thought                                                                                                                Hidden Complications    
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